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Abstract
Previous empirical evidence on municipal e¢ciency mostly uses cross-sectional data which
makes it impossible to separate unobserved heterogeneity from ine¢ciency. Furthermore, they
also typically use a two stages approach which has been widely criticized as the assumptions in
the rst stage are violated in the second stage, generating biased results. We present a longitu-
dinal parametric study that analyzes municipal e¢ciency and its determinants using a one step
procedure. Moreover, we analize overall e¢ciency as well as e¢ciency by clusters of municipal-
ities in order to reduce heterogeneity. We use administrative datasets of Chilean municipalities
for 2008-2010 period and our results suggest that Chilean municipalities have on average an
ine¢ciency level of 32% with a signicant variance between clusters of municipalities. Also,
our results suggest that socio-economic, scal and political variables a¤ect municipal e¢ciency.
In particular, we found that municipalities with tighter budget constraints are associated with
more e¢cient municipalities.
Keywords: E¢ciency, Local governments, Panel Data, Parametric Estimation, Chile.
JEL Classication: H71, H72, H83, D24, O54
1 Introduction
Local governments (municipalities) are a crucial factor when politicians pursue a decentralized
system of policy making. This is because they are the closest political level to the population and
their needs. Due to this, they have their own budgets and are in general mandated to provide a
number of services to their community.
We acknowledge Matthieu Berrones collaboration and the comments of Hermann von Gersdor¤, Lucas Palacios
and Juan Luis Correa.
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Given their relevance, there have been a long series of studies which tried to measure the level
of e¢ciency on municipal provision of public services. Traditionally, previous literature have used
a two stages approach, a rst stage to estimate ine¢ciency and a second stage to estimate the
determinants that a¤ect the previously estimated ine¢ciency. This two-stages approach has been
widely criticized (Wang and Schmidt, 2002) because the assumptions in the second stage contradicts
those made in the rst stage, potentially biasing the results. In particular, in the rst stage it is
assumed that the ine¢ciency term is independent and identically distributed while in the second
step ine¢ciency is deterministic. Thus, a one stage approach has been suggested to solve the
drawbacks of the two stage approach.
Additionally, the vast majority of previous literature uses a cross-section approach. This has
the drawback that it is not possible to separately identify ine¢ciency from municipal unobserved
heterogeneity. In order to overcome this di¢culty, models with panel data have been suggested.
Recent literature have used panel data for municipal e¢ciency estimation. Unfortunately, the vast
majority of recent previous literature have used non-parametric methods which uses a two stage
approach to estimate ine¢ciency and their determinants (Greene 2005c). Apart from this, they face
other drawbacks. In particular, non-parametric methods uses linear programing techniques instead
of econometric methods which implies that the error is calculated and not estimated. This in turn
implies that non-parametric techniques have a deterministic nature. In this way, any deviation
from the frontier is interpreted as ine¢ciency even though the source of these deviations may be
due to variables that are not under the control of the municipality. Furthermore, with availability
of panel data, non-parametric methods have an additional drawback. As non-parametric methods
optimize period by period, e¢ciency score is computed for each single year as just in a cross-sectional
framework, therefore they ignore the panel dimension of the data.
There is a very scarce empirical literature that uses a one stage approach with parametric
models and panel data to estimate municipal e¢ciency. We contribute in this sense by providing
a study with these characteristics. In particular, we present an e¢ciency analysis of 309 Chilean
municipalities followed for the period 2008-2010. For this task we use administrative data provided
by the Chilean Government on the municipal provision of a series of goods and services. Among
them the more important are: education, health, rubbish collection, maintained green areas, etc.
Results suggest that Chilean municipalities are heterogeneous in their ine¢ciency levels and that
on average ine¢ciency reaches 16% approximately. This is, Chilean municipalities could provide the
same amount of services but with a 16% less of resources. Regarding heterogeneity, we also analyze
ine¢ciency by more homogeneous subgroups of municipalities (clusters). We nd that results go in
the same direction than the general model although there are heterogeneous results when clusters
were compared. Despite this, when we analyze the most e¢cient municipalities per cluster, we
found similar patterns in the e¤ects of the determinants. We found that municipalities with the
best results in each cluster have a higher dependency of the Fondo Comun Municipal relative self-
generated revenues, higher investment as a percentage of total expenditure, a lower schooling level
and a higher political concentration.
This study is organized as follows: section 2 provides the institutional framework of municipal
management while section 3 presents the literature review. Section 4 presents the details of the
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methodology used in this work. Section 5 put fowards the procedure for the construction of mu-
nicipal clusters, the data and the summary statistics. Section 6 and 7 present the results and the
sensitivity analysis respectively. Finally, section 8 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 Institutional Framework
Chile is organized in 15 regions.1 Each of them has provinces (54 in total) and each of the provinces
has municipalities (345 in total). The Organic Law of Municipalities (Law No18.695) establishes
how municipalities are constituted (i.e. the Major and the City Council), how their authorities
are elected and their attributions. The major has two main attributions: (i) those related with
municipal management and (ii) those attributed to the municipality as an institution. Among the
former, the major has to be the legal responsible individual in judicial and extra-judicial cases and
also he/she is the responsible for the municipal budget. On the other hand, the city council is in
charge of scalization and enhancement of community participation.
2.1 Specic functions of the local government
The Organic Law of Municipalities (Law No18.695) establishes that the local government has 6
exclusive responsibilities and 13 shared with other institutions. Among the former are: the plan-
ication and management of the development communal plan (PLADECO), promotion of co-
munitarian development, public transport regulation, hygiene services, urbanism and construction
norms. Among the shared responsibilities are those which attributes to municipalities the main
responsibility for education and health at the local government area.
Regarding nancial matters, article 13o of the Organic Law of Municipalities (Law No18.695)
establishes the main source of municipal assets, among which are:
 All real state goods they acquire
 Transfers from the regional government
 Resources from the municipal common fund (FCM).
 Benets obtained from the services they deliver and for any concession (rights) or permits
they give.
 Income received as a result of their activities and activities in related dependencies.
 Income collected from all the taxes the law allows local government to charge. Among these
are: territorial tax, transport tax and commercial rights on alcoholic sells.
 Interests and penalties.
1Arica and Parinacota, Tarapacá, Antofagasta, Atacama, Coquimbo, Valparaíso, Región Metropolitana, del
Libertador Bernardo OHiggins, Maule, Bío-Bío, Araucanía, de Los Ríos, de Los Lagos, Aysén and Carlos Ibañez del
Campo and Magallanes and Chilean Antartica.
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Municipal income can be classied depending on the source of funding. There are two main
funding sources: permanent self-generated revenues (IPP) and municipal common fund (FCM ).
Other sources are transfers from regional government and the central government. Among the
latter are transfers for education and health services. In this way, local government act as an
intermediary between local education and health services and the respective ministry. Next, we
present the detail of the income sources of the municipal budget coming from non-conditional
transfers of the central government (education and health), i.e. permanent self-generated revenues
(IPP) and municipal common fund (FCM ).
2.1.1 Municipal Common Fund (FCM)
The Municipal common fund is a fund created by the local government reform in 1979. The
objective is to redistribute communal income in order to guarantee the achievement of municipal
functions and its adequate functioning. In this way, the sources of funding of the FCM come
from municipal income and are dened by article 14o of the Organic Law of Municipalities (Law
No18.695) in the way presented in Table 1.
Regarding the mechanism of distribution of this fund, there is a dened structure which denes it.
The mechanism of distribution can be observed in Table 2. In this way, the rst 25% corresponds
to amount transferred to be distributed in the same proportion in all the municipalities in the
country. The next 10% is distributed depending on poverty levels (i.e. number of poor people
relative to poor people in the country). The next 30% is distributed according to the number of
assets exempt of territorial tax relative to the total of exempts asset (regarding territorial tax only)
in the country. Finally, the last 35% is transferred to those municipalities which generate lower
permanent self-generated revenue (IPP) per capita than the national average.
2.1.2 Permanent self-generated revenues (IPP)
Permanent self-generated revenues (IPP) is the source of funds a local government generates from
municipal management. Income generated from this source has no restriction on where or in what
to invest. From article 38 of the municipal rents law No3,063, IPP are composed by: municipal
rights income, hygiene rights, concessions, municipal property rents, percentage of the income from
territorial tax and transport tax, among others. From these sources most of the income of IPP
comes from: territorial tax, commercial rights and transport tax. The rst one is a tax imposed
to agricultural and non-agricultural land.2 From this source of income, only 40% remains in the
municipality for its own funding and the other 60% is directed to the municipal common fund
(FCM).3
Commercial rights are regulated mainly by the municipality as it chooses the tax rate to charge
(subject to a range established by the law). Of the amount of income collected by commercial rights,
2This is regulated in the Law No17,235 about territorial tax.
3For the four richest municipalities, Santiago, Providencia, Las Condes and Vitacura percentage are: 35% and
65% respectively.
4
only the richest four municipalities (Santiago, Providencia, Las Condes and Vitacura) transfer a
proportion to the FCM: Santiago 55% and the other three 65%. Finally, regarding transport tax,
from the amount collected the 37,5% goes for municipal benet and the rest (64,5%) go to the
FCM.
3 Literature Review
3.1 Parametric versus Non-Parametric approaches
In order to measure e¢ciency two types of approaches have been used: non-parametric (such as Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH)) and parametric (such as Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA)). On the one hand, the non-parametric approach analyzes e¢ciency from
the data available and not from imposed functional forms. Also, it uses linear programing techniques
instead of econometric methods which makes that the error is calculated and not estimated implying
that non-parametric techniques have a deterministic nature. In this way, any deviation from the
frontier is interpreted as ine¢ciency even though the source of these deviations may be due to
variables that are not under the control of the municipality. Also, non-parametric methods use two
stages procedures, which have been criticized because of the contradictions between the assumptions
made in the rst stage versus to what is estimated in the second stage. Furthermore, with availability
of panel data, non-parametric methods have an additional drawback. As non-parametric methods
optimize period by period, e¢ciency score is computed for each single year as just in a cross-sectional
framework, therefore they ignore the panel dimension of the data.
Parametric methods, such as the stochastic frontier analysis, originally developed by Aigner,
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van Broeck (1977), come from an extension of Or-
dinary Least Squares (OLS) and Maximum Likelihood (ML). In this way, while OLS estimate the
most appropriate function of medium cost, the stochastic frontier analysis estimates the maximum
production or the minimum cost. Furthermore, it decomposes the deviation from the frontier in
to a random component (the error term) and the ine¢ciency. In this way, this approach can ac-
commodate exogenous shocks such as bad weather and separate it from ine¢ciency. An additional
advantage of parametric methods is that, when there is panel data, they take into account the
unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities, which could play a crucial role in explaining the
performance of cities.4 The drawback of parametric methods is the necessity of an assumption
about the production (or cost) function. As, in this study, we use the parametric approach, we
tackle its weakness by assuming di¤erent production (cost) functions in order to check if results are
sensitive to them.
4Parametric methods estimate the time prole of the scores endogenously in a single panel.
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3.2 Empirical Evidence on Municipal E¢ciency5
The analysis of municipal e¢ciency has been carried out mainly in two steps models: the rst one as
an e¢ciency analysis itself and the second as an evaluation of its determinants (see Bellaguer-Coll
et al. (2002), Herrera and Francke (2009), Afonso and Fernandes (2006)).
In this way, in the rst step the focus has been placed on the analysis of the productive process
by which the local government utilize the available resources to generate goods and services; As
such, municipal performance has been measured by the e¢ciency of municipal expenditure. The
results obtained in previous literature, which focused in municipal e¢ciency, suggests that there are
important ine¢ciencies on municipal expenditure. For example, the Afonso and Fernandez (2006)
DEA study for Portugal concludes that on average municipalities of the Lisbon region could achieve
the same performance with 39% less resources. Similarly, a second DEA evaluation applied to 278
Portuguese municipalities showed similar ine¢ciency levels (Afonso and Fernandez 2008). For Peru,
the parametric cross-section analysis of Herrera and Francke (2009) showed that municipalities could
achieve the same provision of good and services with 58% less resources. In the same line, Pang, Liu,
Peng and Wu (2010) nd ine¢ciency levels of 41% for Taiwanese municipalities and Balaguer-Coll
et al. (2007) with a DEA and a FDH nd similar results for Spain.
Studies focused on the second stage, where the determinants of the ine¢ciency are estimated,
showed that for Belgium, De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) nd that the level of education has
positive e¤ects on municipal e¢ciency while average income and the amount of transfers relative
to local income have negative e¤ects on municipal e¢ciency. Also for Belgium, Van den Eckaut et
al. (1993) nd a positive relationship between municipal e¢ciency and political composition of the
City Council (i.e. better results for municipalities with heterogeneous composition of the council
versus those with a more homogeneous composition). For Peru, Herrera and Francke (2009) nd
that a higher participation in FONCOMUN (similar to the Chilean FCM) has negative e¤ect on
municipal e¢ciency while political participation a¤ects positively municipal e¢ciency. The para-
metric and non-parametric evaluation of Greek municipalities by Anthanassopoulos and Triantis
(1998) nd a negative relationship between e¢ciency levels and the ratio of transfers over munici-
pal total income, population density and political a¢liation (measured as parties a¢liated to the
central government). For Finland, Loikkanen and Susiluoto (2005) nd a positive relationship be-
tween municipal e¢ciency and certain age groups (mainly with individuals between 35-49 years old)
and a negative relationship with peripheric geographic location, high income levels, high popula-
tion, transfers of good and services from other municipalities and higher participation in municipal
funds. For Taiwan, Pang, Liu, Peng and Wu (2010) concluded that environmental policies adopted
by municipalities were crucial for municipal e¢ciency. Cordero et al (2017) apply time-dependent
conditional frontier estimators to assess the performance of the 278 Portuguese mainland municipal-
ities for the 20092014 period. Following Mastromarco and Simar (2015) conditional nonparametric
frontier analysis, they found that the economic and demographic indicators included as contextual
variables in their model play an important role as inuencing the production set, although those
e¤ects do not seem to vary much over time. This evidence was corroborated after they conducted
a second-stage nonparametric regression of the conditional e¢ciency measures over those variables.
In one of the very few parametric studies with panel data, Bianchini (2010) evaluates the ef-
ciency of 100 Italian chief towns of Province in providing urban environmental quality during
5For a systematic literature review on the Local governments e¢ciency see Narbón-Perpiñá & De Witte (2018).
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1998-2007. She nds that, besides socio-economic variables, those which explain di¤erent munic-
ipal performance are the scal and political ones. The other known parametric panel data study
has been carried out for the Czech Republic by Stastna and Gregor (2011). They nd that popula-
tion size, distance to the regional center, share of university educated citizens, capital expenditure,
subsidies per capita and the share of self-generated revenues increase ine¢ciency.
Previous results from the literature, as those mentioned above, are based on a variety of esti-
mation methods. On the one hand, parametric methods have been used which assume a functional
form to model the relationship between the variables of input and output and on the other hand
non-parametric methods have been used, which assume that any deviation from the frontier are
due to ine¢ciency. Under this general setup, the stochastic frontier analysis is the main parametric
approach while the data envelopment analysis and the free disposal hull are the main approaches in
non-parametric methods. Due to the variety of techniques for the estimation of municipal e¢ciency,
there have been some studies which focuses on the analysis of the di¤erences of the results given
by the di¤erent techniques. As such, De Borger and Kerstens (1996a and 1996b) in Belgium and
Worthington (2000) and Worthington and Dollery (2000) in Australia explore the di¤erences of the
results given for the same municipalities using parametric and non-parametric methods. Similarly,
Van den Eckaut et al. (1993) focused in the comparison of the results of DEA and FDH. All these
studies have shown that the result obtained about municipal e¢ciency is sensitive to the technique
used. However, despite the magnitude of e¢ciency changes from method to method, the general
results are very similar.
Furthermore, it is important to mention that all the parametric evidence uses cross sectional
data (except Bianchini (2010) and Stastna and Gregor (2011)). This is crucial as, this kind of
data, may be informative for e¢ciency measures but it has the drawback that it is not possible to
disentangle municipal e¢ciency from municipal heterogeneity (see Greene 2005a, 2005b and 2005c).
Bianchini (2010) and Stastna and Gregor (2011) have carried out an overall analysis. Some authors
(Afonso and Fernandez 2008) have criticized this as municipalities are very heterogeneous, which
may be due to omitted variables, generating in this way a misspecied model. To reduce this risk
the authors proposed to use more homogeneous clusters of municipalities.
For parametric models, the majority of the empirical evidence on technical e¢ciency mentioned
above uses a two step approach, where the second step estimates the determinants of the ine¢ciency
estimated in the rst step. This is carried out regressing the estimated ine¢ciency on exogenous
variables which may a¤ect municipal performance. This two step method has been widely criticized
in the literature because this method assumes that the exogenous variables included in the second
step are not correlated with the variables used to estimate the ine¢ciency in the rst step. The
reason for this is that in the rst step it is assumed that ine¢ciency is independent and identically
distributed but in the second step the assumption is that ine¢ciency is explained by exogenous
variables, which may be a contradiction. In other words, if the variables included in the second step
are not orthogonal to those included in the rst step, this method will obtain biased results (Wang
and Schmidt 2002). In this way, to increase the number of input, output or exogenous variables will
probably increase the probability of violating the assumption. This issue is particularly problematic
for two stage studies that employ non-parametric methods (Simar and Wilson 2007).6
6 In their own words:"A more serious problem in all of the two-stage studies that we have found arises from
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To solve this problem in the parametric case Khumbhakar, Gosh and McGuckin (1991) proposed
a one step estimation method where determinants of ine¢ciency are estimated jointly with the
frontier given the appropriate assumptions about the error terms. This method of estimation solves
the inconsistency on the estimators due to the assumptions imposed on the ine¢ciency term. Exists
two options for this one step estimation. The rst one incorporates the exogenous determinants of
the ine¢ciency directly in to the production function (Battese and Coelli, 1992) and the second
one and more used in the literature, includes the exogenous determinants into the mean of the
ine¢ciency term (Battese and Coelli, 1995). Interpretation of results di¤er in each option. In
the former, the e¤ect of the determinants of the ine¢ciency term determines the position of the
production function whereas in the latter they are interpreted as the distance to the frontier. As
our objective is to analyze the determinants of municipal ine¢ciency, we use the Battese and Coelli
(1995) approach (i.e. we include the exogenous determinants into the mean of the ine¢ciency term),
all this carried out in one step in order to avoid the problems described above. Furthermore, we
also carry out both, an overall and a cluster analysis of Chilean municipalities in order to reduce
the risk of omitted variables.
4 Methodology
4.1 Deterministic Frontier Analysis
As mentioned above there are two approaches used for the estimation of frontier functions, the
parametric and the non-parametric methods. The former approach can be divided in to its de-
terministic versus its stochastic branch. Regarding the deterministic branch, a lengthy literature
commencing with theoretical work by Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) and the pioneering empir-
ical study by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) has been directed at models of production that
specically account for the proposition that a production function is a theoretical ideal. If y = f(x)
denes a production relationship between inputs, x, and an output, y, then for any given x, the
observed value of y must be less than or equal to f(x). The implication for an empirical regression
model is that in a formulation such as y = h(x; )+u, u must be negative. Because the theoretical
production function is an idealthe frontier of e¢cient productionany nonzero disturbance must
be interpreted as the result of ine¢ciency. By duality the former approach presented for product
maximization, can be applied for cost minimization.
Due to the limitation of the deterministic frontier approach Aigner et al. (1977) proposed instead
a formulation within which observed deviations from the production function could arise from two
sources: (1) productive ine¢ciency, that would necessarily be negative, and (2) idiosyncratic e¤ects
that are specic to the rm and that could enter the model with either sign. The end result was
what they labeled as stochastic frontier.
the fact that DEA e¢ciency estimates are serially correlated. Consequently, standard approaches to inference are
invalid". Furthermore, the two stage approach is routine in the DEA literature (Greene 2005c).
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4.2 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
The Stochastic Frontier Analysis was developed by Aigner, et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van
Broeck (1977) as a model to estimate production and/or cost frontiers. In general, the approach
followed in the literature, either production maximization or cost minimization, depends upon
the exogeneity of output and inputs variables. In particular, when inputs are considered more
exogenous than the product (i.e. that they do not fully depend on municipal management) product
maximization is used and viceversa. In order to choose, the institutional framework is crucial, and
given the Chilean institutional framework described above, where output is given by the law (i.e.
exogenous) and inputs depend on municipal management, a cost minimization approach is more
adequate for our analysis.
Greene (2005c) argues that cost ine¢ciency is a blend of the two sources technical and allocative.
Despite this complexity, there are several studies which analyze cost ine¢ciency because they allow
to include multiple inputs, which is not straightforward on the production side. It is important to
notice that any deviation from cost e¢ciency may come from two sources: input-oriented technical
ine¢ciency and allocative ine¢ciency. In order to estimate the latter, additional data should be
available, for example: the vector of inputs prices. If the additional data is not available it is only
possible to estimate the input-oriented technical ine¢ciency. As in the Chilean case, we do not
know all the inputs and their respective prices, we focus our attention in this study only on input-
oriented technical ine¢ciency. Throughout this study we will refer to the input-oriented technical
e¢ciency as cost e¢ciency.
Hence, Aigner, et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van Broeck (1977) input-oriented specication,
dene the minimum cost level for observation i needed to produce a good and services vector given
inputs prices (wi). In this way the model can be expressed as:
Ci = C(yi; wi; ) exp(vi + ui) (1)
i = 1; :::::; N with ui  0
where:
Ci is the observed (actual) cost or expenditure of municipality i
C(yi; wi; ) is the cost frontier of municipality i
yi is the output vector of municipality i
 is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
vi is an iid random variable:This variable represents exogenous factors which are not controlled
by the municipality which a¤ect the cost level (e.g. weather, luck , regulation, etc). ui is a random
variable which correspond to the ine¢ciency level in costs and its distribution will depend on the
assumptions made (explained below).
The parameters of this model are estimated by Maximum Likelihood, given suitable distri-
butional assumptions for the error term. Aigner, et al. (1977) assumed that vi has a normal
distribution and ui has either the half-normal or the exponential distribution. The main criticism
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is that there is no a priory justication for the selection of any particular distributional form for
the ui . Since then, started a literature which have proposed more general distributional forms,
such as the truncated-normal (Stevenson 1980) and the two-parameter Gamma (Greene 1997).7
It is crucial to notice that deviations between the observed cost (Ci) and the frontier (C(yi; wi; ))
can come from two sources: technical ine¢ciency of the municipality (ui) or random shocks which
are not under the control of the municipality (vi). Both components are assumed to be independent
from each other. The stochastic frontier method consist on the estimation of the variation of (vi)
and (ui) in order to obtain evidence of the relative e¤ect of each of them on costs. Thus, the cost
e¢ciency level of a municipality (CE ) will be given by the ratio between actual costs and the cost
frontier in order to reach certain output yi, given input prices wi. Formally this is:
CEi =
C(yi; wi; ) exp(vi)
C(yi; wi; ) exp(vi + ui)
= exp( ui) (2)
when the value of equation (2) tends to 1, implies that municipality i is very e¢cient in terms
of costs because actual costs will be similar to the cost e¢cient level. On the other hand, CE<1
provides a measure of the gap between the minimum possible cost and the one observed. The
ine¢ciency term itself (ui) is not observable, therefore "i = vi+ ui must be used for the estimation
of equation (2). In order to do this, the estimation is carried out computing the expected value of
the ine¢ciency term component (ui) given the composite error term ("i). This is:
CEi = E [exp ( uij"i)] = E [exp ( uij(vi + ui))] (3)
In order to nd E [ uij"i] the conditional density function must be known, and this function is
dened by:
f (uij"i) = f(ui; "i)
f("i)
=
f(ui; (vi + ui))
f("i)
(4)
To estimate this, it is necessary to assume a probability distribution for both error components.
As it was previously mentioned, in all the models the vi is considered as independent and identically
distributed following a normal distribution (N
 
0; 2v

). Despite there are no consensus on which
distribution to assume for ui, the most used one in the empirical literature is the truncated-normal
(N +
 
; 2u

). The main reason for this is that this distribution allows us to estimate the deter-
minants of the ine¢ciency in one step, avoiding the problems presented above when a two stage
approach is carried out.
7Truncated normal and the two-parameter Gamma were introduced because the Half-normal and exponential
distributions both have a mode at zero. This causes conditional technical ine¢ciency scores, specially in the neigh-
bourhood of zero that can involve articially high technical e¢ciency levels. The Truncated Normal is more exible
since the modal e¢ciency value can also be away from one, and for this reason in most empirical works it is preferred
relative to the Half Normal.
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After both distributions are dened, their distributions functions should be obtained:
f (vi) =
1
v
p
2
exp
 v2
22v

(5)
f (ui) =
2
u
p
2
exp
 u2
22u

(6)
as the joint density function (f(ui; "i)) is unknown, the joint density function of both error term
components can be estimated (f(ui; vi)) and replaced it in the term vi = "i   ui. As ui and vi are
independent to each other, the joint density function corresponds to the product of the individual
density functions such as:
f(ui:vi) = f(ui) f(vi) =
2
2vu
exp
 u2
22u
  v
2
22v

(7)
by replacing v = "  u we obtain the joint density function of ui and "i:
f(ui:"i) =
2
2vu
exp
 u2
22u
  ("  u)
2
22v

(8)
Now, to nd the denominator of equation (4), we integrate equation (8) to get:
f("i) =
1Z
0
f(ui:"i)du =
2p
2

1  

 "


exp
 "2
22

(9)
where 2 = 2u + 
2
v and  =
u
v
and () is the cumulative distribution function of a standard
normal. Using this parametrization,  is the ratio of the variability coming from each of the variables
that conform the composite error term. Therefore, if 2u ! 0 (and thus  ! 0), it is the random
e¤ect the one that predominates relative to the ine¢ciency and thus the density function of the
composite error term tends to a normal. On the other hand, if 2u !1 (and thus !1) the gap
between the minimum cost and the actual cost will be mainly determined by the ine¢ciency (ui).
Finally, replacing equation (9) in to equation (4) we obtain the density function of u given ":
f (uij"i) = f(ui; "i)
f("i)
=
1p
2

1     

exp (u  )2
22

(10)
where:
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 =
 "2u
2
(11)
2 =
2u
2
v
2
(12)
From the above, we conclude that f (uij"i) is the density function of a variable that distributes
N +
 
; 2

:Once this distribution is known, and given that the value of cost ine¢ciency ui is not
observable, it is possible to use the expected value E(uij"i) as the estimator of the cost ine¢ciency
of each municipality.
E(uij"i) =  + 
2
4 

 
i


1  

 
i


3
5 (13)
where  () is the density function of a standard normal. Thus, the cost e¢ciency function for a
municipality is:
CEi = E [exp ( uij"i)] =
1  

   i


1  

 i

 ex p i + 22

(14)
4.3 Determinants of the Ine¢ciency
As it was previously mentioned, a branch of the stochastic frontier literature has incorporated a
second stage where the determinants of the ine¢ciency found in the rst stage are estimated. This
approach has been criticized by more recent literature (Wang and Schmidt, 2002) and a one stage
approach has been suggested which solves the drawbacks of the two stage approach.
In order to carry out this one stage approach, there are two alternatives: the rst one incorpo-
rates the determinants directly as regressors in the non-stochastic component of the cost frontier.
The second one, incorporates indirectly the determinants in the stochastic component, in particular
on the variable ui. Thus, in the rst approach, it is assumed that determinants a¤ect directly the
cost frontier by moving it. On the other hand, the second approach assumes that determinants
a¤ects the costs ine¢ciency levels. This latter approach was introduced in the literature by Battese
and Coelli (1995) and it allows to nd which are the determinants of the estimated ine¢ciency.
Therefore, the interpretation of the results corresponds to the distance between the e¤ective costs
and the cost frontier.
There is no consensus in the literature on which of the previous alternatives is preferred (Greene
2005c). Due to this and given our objective of nding the determinants of the ine¢ciency, we use
the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach.
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4.4 Estimation Method
When panel data is available, there are two main approaches for the estimation of frontier functions:
xed and random e¤ects. In order to choose the more appropriate method it is important to consider
the assumptions about the ine¢ciency term and the linearity of the production function. If the
production function is not linear, then the within estimator will be inconsistent as the di¤erence
with respect to the mean may not eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity, furthermore, in short
panels (as in our case) xed e¤ects su¤er of what is known as incidental parameter problem and
random e¤ects should be used. If the production function is linear, then in principle both methods
may be appropriate depending on the assumptions made on the ine¢ciency term.
When ine¢ciency term is time invariant the Fixed E¤ect and the Random E¤ect present prob-
lems as in both approaches ui carries both the ine¢ciency and, in addition, any time invariant
municipal specic heterogeneity. Additionally, for both approaches, the time invariance assumption
in long time series of data, is likely to be a particularly strong assumption.
For these reasons, recent literature have promoted models with a time varying ine¢ciency term.
Even in this context, xed e¤ects do not take into account time invariant covariates (which is our
ultimate interest in this study). Due to this, a random e¤ects model is preferred (see more details
in Appendix A, available upon request). This model can be expressed as:
ln(C(yit; )) = 0 +
RX
r=1
rln(yrit) +
1
2
RX
r=1
KX
k=1
kln(yrit)ln(ykit) +
JX
j=1
jxjt + vit + uit (15)
where C(yit; ) is the cost function of municipality i in period t. yit is the output of municipality
i in period t;  is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; We also include the variable
xt which are dummies that control for time. vit is a white noise which is assumed independent
and identically distributed (iid) N
 
0; 2v

and independent of uit. uit represents the non negative
ine¢ciency term which may vary over time and distributed as truncated-normal (N +
 
zit; 
2
u

).
This is:
uit = z
0
it +Wit (16)
where zit are the determinants of the ine¢ciency of municipality i at time t,  is a vector of
unknown parameters to be estimated and Wit is a white noise distributed N
+
 
0; 2u

:Finally, as
the cost measure is usually specied in natural logs, the ine¢ciency term, uit, can be interpreted
as the percentage deviation of observed performance from the municipalitys own frontier (at least
for small deviations).
The model follows Battese and Coelli (1995) but applied to cost minimization. Their model
consider the joint maximization of equations (15) and (16) by maximum likelihood (ML). The esti-
mated parameters should be replaced in equation (15) obtaining the estimated variables presented
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in equations (11) and (12). Then these variables are used in equation (14) to estimate municipal
ine¢ciency.
For the e¢ciency analysis, homogeneity of the municipalities under study is important. Previ-
ous literature (Afonso and Fernández 2008) have pointed out the importance of homogeneity as a
highly heterogeneous group of municipalities may be the result of omitted variables and thus of a
misspecied model (e.g. due to scale e¤ects). The authors suggest the use of clusters of municipal-
ities. Given this, we estimate the model explained above for the whole sample rst, and then for
each of the clusters dened with the methodology described below. In this way we will consider
more homogenous municipalities which will allow us to decrease the risk of omitted variables.
5 Municipal Clustering, Data and Summary Statistics
5.1 Municipal Clustering
Chilean municipalities are highly heterogeneous regarding their territory, nancial capacity and
human resources (Valenzuela 2008). These di¤erences impact directly on municipal organization,
in their capacity of self generate resources and in the way of confronting services administration
and public programs. Therefore, it is important to separate municipalities into clusters where these
clusters will be dene according to some variables, otherwise the comparison between municipalities
will be less informative as, for example, we will be comparing Las Condes (the richest municipality)
with Cobquecura (a poor rural municipality).
In order to do the clustering, we use the municipal typology of the provision of municipal services
elaborated by the Undersecretarship of Regional Development (SUBDERE ).8 This typology is
elaborated based on clusters with the objective of group municipalities with a minimum internal
variance between them and maximal external variance with other groups (see a detailed description
of the methodology inAppendix B, available upon request). The conformed groups are determined
by grouping variables which can not be any of the variables to be used in the estimation. This is
because we want to obtain unbiased and consistent results. In the municipal typology elaborated by
SUBDERE, municipalities are clustered following two concepts: socio-territorial and socio economic
indexes. which are described in Table 3.
From these clusters, and using both indexes, a graphic analysis of the dispersion is presented
(Figure 1). This gure suggests which groups can be identied. Based in this analysis and
following the number of clusters of SUBDERE we dene 6 clusters as presented in Table 4. For our
estimations presented below, we grouped clusters 1 and 2 into one cluster due to few observations
in cluster 1. Thus, we use 5 clusters for our analysis (see Table 5), where our new cluster 1
consolidates the former 1 and 2. To see their main characteristics see Table 6.
8 It is a governmental Institution in charge of local governments, regions and provinces of Chile. SUBDERE
publishes a document with the typology named Tipología Comunal para la Provisión de Servicios Municipales,
División de Municipalidades, Departamento de Finanzas Municipales. SUBDERE, Ministerio del Interior.
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5.2 Data description and Summary Statistics
The data for this study comes from the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM ). This
system is a management tool which consolidate a group of variables and statistical data of munici-
palities. SINIM is updated once a year and has information of all 345 municipalities in Chile from
2001 to 2010. For this study we use data for 2008-2010. The reason for this is that for some of the
variables needed there are no previous information. The main sources of information for SINIM
are municipalities (40% of the information) and ministries or other public services (60%). SINIM
is the main source of information for municipal issues as it includes information on management,
nance, human resources and municipal characterization.
For our analysis we use output and input variables as well as determinants. Therefore, we now
explain which variables were included in each of them.
a) Output Variable:
Due to the inherent di¢culties of quantify the output provided by municipalities, proxies will be
used. These variables should consider the multiple functions assigned to municipalities and capture
the results obtained in all the areas where they deliver goods and services. After the revision of
the empirical literature and given the data available we include 8 output variables described below
and whose summary statistics are described in Table 7.
1. Education: one of the main services provided by municipalities is education. Municipalities
provide education throughout municipal schools. To measure the amount of education provided we
use 2 variables: number of schools and the average monthly registered students at those schools.
2. Health: this is another of the most important services provided by municipalities. To capture
the amount of health services provided we use the number of health centres.
3. Urbanism: another function of municipalities is to provide roads and places of recreation
such as parks, squares, etc. To measure the services provided in this area we include the square
meters of maintained green areas.
4. Hygiene: municipalities are in charge of basic services in order to promote wellbeing. In
order to have a measure of the amount of services provided in this item we use two variables: tons
of collected rubbish and houses with sewer.
5. Social Services: we consider services provided to social organizations which have municipal
promotion and funding such as sport clubs, municipal services, elderly clubs, etc. To measure the
amount of this kind of services we include the variable social organization which register all social
organization by municipality.
6. Municipal Scale: nally, we consider the scale (size) of the municipality as an output (for the
general model only, as this is an important variable for clustering) as bigger municipalities should
provide more public services.
b) Input Variable:
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After the denition of the output variables we dene the resources used for the provision of public
services such as those presented above. Previous literature use current (i.e. operational) expenditure
as input. The reason for this is because capital expenditure is highly volatile. We follow the same
route as in the Chilean case capital expenditure is also volatile. Additionally, current expenditure
represents more than 75% of total expenditure, hence we are covering the majority of it. Given this,
we have two alternatives: (a) use total current expenditure or (b) use current expenditure of those
services provided. The di¤erences between the two is that the former also includes expenditure on
items that are not easily or directly attributed to some particular output. For this reason we choose
to use as input the current expenditure of those services provided (i.e. expenditure in: employees,
consumption good and services and transfers to education and health). For this reason, we should
keep in mind that for the interpretation of the results it should be considered that we are measuring
e¢ciency on a subgroup of all the possible good and services a municipality can provide. In any
case, we check the sensitivity of our results with the alternative specication below. Their summary
statistics are also reported in Table 7.
c) Determinants of municipal e¢ciency:
To measure the e¤ect of demographic, economic and scal factors on ine¢ciency, the model
must incorporate some exogenous variables that may be considered relevant on municipal perfor-
mance. Determinants can represent direct e¤ect on municipal e¢ciency or discretionary inputs or
unobservable outputs. Discretionary inputs refer to production in a favorable environment while
unobservable outputs indicate service quality (as the included output variable in the model above
do not measure quality but quantity).
Determinants can have several e¤ects on ine¢ciency, thus it is complex to identify the limits
of the e¤ect of each determinant. Previous literature on the determinants of municipal ine¢ciency
use similar variables for this purpose and for estimating the ine¢ciency. These are the variables
used to estimate the determinants of the ine¢ciency:
i. Education: a higher proportion of educated people may imply higher e¢ciency (De Borger
and Kerstens, 1996a). The reason for this is that the municipality should have a more qualied
labor force. This should also improve the accountability of the population relative to municipal
performance. To approximate educational level we use the average schooling level of the population
by municipality.
ii. Population (only for clusters): the hypothesis is that the bigger the population the bigger
economics of scale and such municipalities could reach higher levels of e¢ciency on the provision of
goods and services. This variable is used in the general model and not for each cluster as population
was one of the variable used to construct the indexes that dened the clusters. To measure this
variable in the general model we include dummy variables that accounts for quarters of population.
In this way we include three dummies leaving the rst quarter as the base category. The four
categories are: 1) 1-9,027; 2) 9,028-17,963; 3) 17,964-51,838; 4) more than 51,838 inhabitants.
iii. Geography: as Stastna and Gregor (2011) pointed out, the hypothesis is that the closer
the geographic distance between the municipality and the regional centre the more intense will be
the competition between them and at the same time access to regional public services gets easier.
In this way, for these reasons we should observe that closer municipalities relative to the regional
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centre would be more e¢cient. To capture this we include a variable that measures distance to the
regional capital.
iv. Fiscal capacity: a lower scal capacity of municipalities implies a tighter budget constraint
reducing the operational surplus, and e¤ect which may a¤ect municipal e¢ciency. To measure this
e¤ect we use four variables: 1) dependency from the common municipal fund (FCM) relative to self-
generated income, 2) percentage of investment relative to total expenditure, 3) current transfers
from public institutions, where the latter is in per capita terms. These variables are included
because they should measure budgetary tightness.
v. Political factors: political characteristics of a municipality may a¤ect e¢ciency in an im-
portant way. The hypothesis is that a high level of political concentration is associated to a lower
e¢ciency because of lack of political competition (Besley et al, 2005). To measure this we use two
variables: 1) a Herndahl index to capture monopolistic degree of the City council9 and 2) the
percentage of the council who belongs to the governmental coalition.
6 Results
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood using the R-Project programme. This software
uses the parametrization of Battese and Corra (1977) which gives  =
2
u
2
instead of  =
2
u
2
v
.
By replacing 2 = 2v + 
2
u we obtain  =
2
u
2
v
+2
u
, which has a value in the range (0-1). The
software allows us to test the signicance of the parameter  in order to evaluate the existence of
ine¢ciency.10 In this way, if the null hypothesis  = 0 is not rejected, implies that 2u = 0 and then
the term u should be dropped from the model allowing the estimation by OLS.
6.1 General Results
From the result of the general model (i.e. without typologies) presented in column1 of Table 8
it can be seen that most of the determinants are signicant at 5% with the exception of the last
dummy of population, distance to the regional capital and the political variable percentage of the
council who belongs to the governmental coalition.
a) Population: results suggest that the bigger the population the higher the e¢ciency levels.
In particular, intermediates cities are more e¢cient than small ones, however big cities are not
statistically di¤erent in e¢ciency terms to small cities.
9This index was constructed using the seats of each political party in the Council.
10The generalized statistic LR, , is dened as:  =  2ln(
L(H0)
L(H1)
), where H0 and H1 are the null and the alternative
hypothesis respectively.If H0 is true then  asymptoticaly distributes as chi-squared. If H0 includes  = 0 (as in our
case), then  distributes as a combined chi-squared. The critical values for this test were obtained from Table 1 of
Kodde and Pam (1986).
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An hypothesis to explain this result is that small municipalities face some di¢culties to provide
a minimum of goods and services due to their lack of economic of scale, moral hazard and political
pressure from certain groups.11 On the other hand, big municipalities even they do have economic
of scale, they may not be enough to compensate the bigger demand for goods and services. Further-
more, they may be providing higher quality services, which increases costs and are not measured
in the model.12
b) Fiscal capacity: results suggest that municipalities will have a lower scal capacity when the
dependency of the FCM relative to their self-generated revenues increases. This lower scal capacity
generate a tighter budget constraint decreasing in this way current expenditure. Similarly, results
suggest that when the percentage of investment over total expenditure increases , municipalities
will have a tighter budget constraint and then a lower current expenditure increasing in this way
the level of e¢ciency. In the same line, higher current transfers from public institutions improve
municipal scal capacity and then increases their current expenditure, lowering their e¢ciency.
c) Education: results are unexpected since they suggest that the higher the schooling level the
higher the ine¢ciency. There are two potential explanations for this: (1) municipalities with higher
levels of schooling have, in general, more resources, and therefore face a higher quality demand
from the community in the provision of good and services than in lower income municipalities. (2)
municipalities with higher schooling levels have more resources and this relax the budget constraint
increasing ine¢ciency.
d) Political factors: results suggest that a higher level of political concentration, is associated
to a higher Herndahl index, make municipalities less ine¢cient. An explanation to this may be
that a higher political concentration will make easier to reach consensus (or agreement) and then
it will allow municipalities to make decisions faster increasing in this way their e¢ciency.
6.2 Results from the Clusters
Results by cluster of municipalities are presented in columns (2-6) of Table 8 and suggest that, in
general, determinants have similar e¤ects in all of them.
From those that measure scal capacity, we nd that dependence of the FCM relative to self-
generated revenues, current per capita transfers from public institutions and percentage of invest-
ment on total expenditure, point to the same direction of the results found with the general model
for all typologies (with the exception of the second and fourth typology where we found no signicant
results at 5%, although they are at 10%, for current transfers and investment).
Regarding the e¤ects of education, we found that its impact is similar to the one estimated for
the general case for typologies 4 and 5, it is not signicant for typology 1, 2 and 3. A potential
11As there are negative correlations between the dependency level of the FCM and population, a municiplity with
a smaller population will have higher dependency of the FCM and lower self-generated income which may induce
moral hazard as resources are not generated by the municipality but transferred from others regardless of municipal
nancial performance.
12 In the typology analysis quality should be less of a problem as we are using a measure of it as one of the variables
to cosntruct the clusters.
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explanation for this results may be that for typologies 4 and 5 there is a lack of scalization from
the population due to: lack of knowledge (less educated people, as seen in Table 6), cultural e¤ects
given by friendship or family relationship (this is easier in smaller towns than in big cities) or less
educated authorities (Mayor and the City Council). For typology 1, 2 and 3 those e¤ects may be
attenuated by their higher average schooling levels and weaker family relationships.
Regarding political factors, we found that results of the Herndhal index are similar in the
clusters and in the general model, in particular for typologies 2 and 3. In the case of typologies 4
and 5 results are not signicantly di¤erent from zero (at 5%). An explanation for this could be that
these two typologies are smaller and poorer then political concentration may be less important
versus familiar and/or cultural links between individuals in the area. Regarding the results of the
other political variable, we found that the percentage of seats of the governmental coalition is only
signicantly di¤erent from zero in typologies 2 and 3 at 5%.
Finally, regarding geographical determinants we found that distance to the regional capital is
signicant (at 5%) for typologies 1, 2 and 5. We found that a further distance to the regional capital
decreases ine¢ciency for typology 2 but increases ine¢ciency for typology 1 and 5.
6.3 Overall results
Regarding the overall results, Table 8 suggests that Chilean municipalities have a signicantly
di¤erent from zero degree of ine¢ciency (i.e. the LR test H0 : 
2
u = 0; rejects the null). In
particular, the aggregate ine¢ciency reaches 32% but after disaggregate by cluster we found that
there is variance as ine¢ciency levels reach 14.6%, 32.2%, 14%, 13.1% and 9.3% for typologies 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5 respectively(see [1-average e¢ciency] in Table 9). These results suggests that typologies
1 and 2 have a higher level of ine¢ciency on the provided services. Furthermore it is important
to notice the high variance on ine¢ciency levels between municipalities within clusters which reach
between 15-19 percentage points. These results can be seen in Figure 2.
It is crucial to remember that this study do not directly measure quality on the services provided,
which can play an important role in some services provided such as education. We tackle this issue
in the next section.
When we analyze all the typologies we found that municipalities in the top quantile of each
cluster present some common characteristics. In particular, we observe in Table 10 that, in gen-
eral, the most e¢cient municipalities (i.e. in the top quantiles) per cluster are those whose current
expenditure in services are lower than the average of the quantile, with typology 5 being an excep-
tion. The same is observed for some of the output variables such as: students registered, rubbish
collection, houses with sewer and maintained green areas. By doing the same exercise to the de-
terminants (Table 11) we found that most e¢cient municipalities have a higher dependency from
the FCM relative to their self-generated revenues, a higher proportion of investment relative to
total expenditure, a lower schooling level and a higher political concentration (as measured by the
Herndhal index).The results for the rst two determinants may be explained by the fact that these
generate a tighter budget constraint and so municipalities use the resources more carefully given
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that they have to provide a minimum of services Similarly, results for education may be explained
because municipalities with lower schooling levels have lower resources and so municipalities use
the money more e¢ciently. The explanation for political concentration is the same given above and
it relate to the fact that more concentrated City Councils take less time to reach agreements.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check the sensitivity of our results we modify some of the assumptions.
7.1 Multicollinearity
In the rst place we check the correlations between the variables. This is important as the Translog
function used for our analysis may be susceptible of multicollinearity and degrees of freedom prob-
lems. Hence, in order to check the level of multicollinearity of the output variables included in the
model, we analyze the correlation between them and the results are presented in Table 12. Results
suggest that levels of correlation are not very high except for two variables, houses with sewer and
rubbish collected. We decided to keep these two variables as their levels of correlation are only high
with a few variables. Furthermore, we repeat the same exercise with the determinants. Results are
presented in Table 13 and suggest that correlations between them are not high.
7.2 Alternative Costs Function
All the analysis was carried out with a Translog cost function which gives exibility and relax some
of the assumptions of the more used Cobb-Douglas. Even though Greene (2005c) pointed out that
results are overall similar irrespective of the function, we now check how our results change when
we vary the cost function. For this, we re estimate the baseline general model but now using the
more restrictive Cobb-Douglas instead of the Translog. Results are presented in Table 14 and
suggest that the overall results are indeed similar (rankings of municipalities are similar as well).
7.3 Alternative denition of inputs
As current expenditure on the services included in our model was used as input for our estimations,
we now check the sensitivity of our results to a slight modication of the input variable. We
reestimate the model but now using total current expenditure. In this way we are considering all
the current resources used by municipalities on the provision of good and services. From Table 15
we observe that results are similar when input variable is slightly modied.
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7.4 Unobservable Heterogeneity
As previously pointed out, parametric methods can take into account unobserved heterogeneity in
explaining municipal performance. As a random e¤ect approach is used in this study, an assumption
is implicitly imposed. This relates to the assumption that there is no correlation between the covari-
ates and the composed error term. As in the error term unobserved heterogeneity is included, this
is included in our assumption. As in the municipal case, it could be questionable that unobserved
heterogeneity is not correlated with the covariates, we relax the assumption by using Mundlaks
(1978) approach. This approach consist on parameterizing the unobserved heterogeneity with the
average (across time) of the time variables covariates. Results with the Mundlak parametrization
are shown in Table 16 and suggest that there are no signicant di¤erences relative the original
model without Mundlaks parametrization.
7.5 Quality
As previously stated, we did not include quality measures in our determinants and thus the general
model focuses in quantity of services provided. Despite this, we indirectly take quality into account
when municipal clusters were dened as one of the variables used for that classication was PSU
average score (were PSU is the national test taken after high school in order to get access to college
and should capture in some degree quality of schooling). Thus, the model estimated for each cluster
considers municipalities with similar PSU scores, and thus with similar schooling quality. In order
to further investigate this, we reestimate the general model but now controlling by the number of
students who obtained more than 450 points at the PSU test score as a determinant. Results are
presented in Table 17 and suggest that the e¤ect of quality is not signicantly di¤erent from zero
(at least in schooling).
8 Conclusion
This study estimates a stochastic frontier model in order to analyze municipal e¢ciency and its
determinants. To estimate the model, unlike most of previous literature, we use panel data from
2008-2010 of 309 Chilean Municipalities and a one stage approach in order to avoid the problems
from the two stages approach.
Results suggest that, in general, Chilean municipalities have on average an ine¢ciency level of
32%. This imply that municipalities can provide the same services but with 16% less resources.
In particular, results suggest that a higher population, a longer distance to the regional capital, a
higher dependency of the FCM relative to self-generated revenues, a higher proportion of invest-
ment relative to total expenditure and a higher political concentration at the local level increases
municipal e¢ciency. On the other hand, a higher per capita capital expenditure, higher per capita
current transfers from public institutions and higher average schooling levels are related to lower
e¢ciency levels.
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Given the high municipal heterogeneity, we reestimate the previous model but at a lower level.
This is we use more homogeneous groups (clusters) of municipalities. Results are, in general, sim-
ilar to those found for the general model. However, we observed that the di¤erence in ine¢ciency
levels between the clusters are signicant. Despite this, when we analyze the most e¢cient munic-
ipalities per cluster, we found similar patterns in the e¤ects of the determinants. We found that
municipalities with the best results in each cluster have a higher dependency of the FCM relative
self-generated revenues, higher investment as a percentage of total expenditure, a lower schooling
level and a higher political concentration.
Finally, we analyze if the di¤erences in e¢ciency levels was due to unmeasured quality. We
include some quality determinants but their e¤ect were not signicantly di¤erent from zero. There-
fore, our results suggest that, in general and given the xed costs on the provision of the minimum
amount of public services established by the law, municipalities with tighter budget constraint use
their resources more carefully and tend to be more e¢cient on the provision of public services.
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Table No1: Sources of Funding of the FCM
Structure of FCM Municipal Contribution Contribution from the
wealthiest Municipalities*
Territorial Tax 60% 65%
Commercial Rights 0% 55% Santiago and 65% Providencia,
Las Condes and Vitacura
Transport Tax 62.5% 62.5%
Vehicles Transfers 50% 50%
Penalties and Fines 100% 100%
Central Government Transfers 218,000 UTM 218,000 UTM
*Santiago, Providencia, Las Condes and Vitacura
Table No2: Mechanism of Distribution of the FCM
Indicator Percentage
same proportion 25%
Poverty 10%
Exempted Land 30%
Permanent Self-generated Revenue (IPP) 35%
Total 100%
25
Table No3:Socio-Territorial and Socio-Economic Indexes
Socio-Territorial
Dimension Description Variables
Size Quantitative dimension of the Population (Census updated to 2008),
population and housing Number of habitable
non-agricultural land
Dispersion Concentration of population on Rurality level (census 2002),
a given territory Populational density (2008) and
Entrophy*
Political-administrative Measures the political and Capital of the region situation and/or
hierarchy administrative relevance of the Capital of the Province situation.
municipality weighted by the
size of its region and/or province
Type of locality Takes into account a group of Score assigned given according to
relations and functions which occur the denition of the Housing and
inside the territory and allow Urbanism Ministry.
identication of rural-urban situations
Socio-Economic
Dimension Description Variables
Communal Assets Corresponds to the communal Average total value, percentage of
commercial activities and the the value a¤ected to taxes, per capita
communal land assets. average collection of commercial rights.
Human Capital Schooling level and educational Average schooling, weighted average
capacity at PSU**, % of literacy.
Socio-economic Material conditions of the % of poverty (CASEN), Average
characteristics of the communal population monetary income of the household.
population
*Entrophy refers to a variable which measures the order-disorder within a system. For our case means the
concentration or dispersion of the population in a given territory. To apply this concept, housing distribution by city
or town is used (Chilean National Institute of Statistics).
**PSU is the national entry test to apply for places at superior education (e.g. University).
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Table No4: Constructed Clusters
Clusters No Cluster Name Population % of Population
Municipalities
1 8 Big Metropolitan Municipalities, 1,010,515 6%
High development
2 39 Big Metropolitan/Urban 7,595,844 45%
Municipalities,medium develop.
3 37 Major Urban Municipalities, 3,543,432 21%
medium development
4 56 Medium Urban Municipalities, 1,777,524 11%
medium development
5 96 Semi-Urban and Rural 1,718,931 10%
Municipalities, medium develop.
6 109 Semi-Urban and Rural 1,117,127 7%
Municipalities,low develop.
TOTAL 345 16,763,373
Table No5: Used Clusters
Clusters No Cluster Name Population % of Population
Municipalities
1 45 Big Metropolitan Municipalities, 8,568,303 53.1%
High +medium development
2 34 Major Urban Municipalities, 3,353,886 20.8%
medium development
3 52 Medium Urban Municipalities, 1,682,469 10.4%
medium development
4 85 Semi-Urban and Rural 1,568,817 9.7%
Municipalities,medium develop.
5 93 Semi-Urban and Rural 974,023 6.0%
Municipalities,low develop.
TOTAL 309 16,147,498
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Table No6: Clusters characteristics
Cluster Average Density % Urban Population % Poverty Average Schooling
1 5,669 100% 18% 12.1
2 200 89% 16% 9.9
3 60 76% 21% 8.8
4 15 60% 11% 8.7
5 12 65% 20% 6.7
Table No7: Output variables summary statistics (average)
All C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4 C 5
Output Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Municipal Comunal Population 52,257 190,407 98,644 32,355 18,457 10,473
Scale
Education Average Monthly 4,520 12,048 9,108 4,017 2,290 1,519
Registered students
Mun. Schools 17 21 23 20 13 14
Health Mun. Health Centres 7 10 10 7 5 6
Urbanism Squared meters of 245,856 744,209 363,194 381,033 88,770 29,810
green areas
Houses w/ 10,864 42,459 19,832 6,388 3,319 1,696
sewer
Hygiene Rubbish 20,670 75,986 44,921 11,175 6,711 3,105
Collected (Tons)
Social Social Organizations 749 1,507 1,521 676 501 367
Services
Input
Expenditure Current Exp. (M$) 4,831 17,697 7,788 2,690 1,950 1,387
Current Exp. on 4,710 16,959 7,701 2,686 1,914 1,345
selected services
28
Table No8: Results for the General model and the ve clusters
Determinants General C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -1.521*** 1.098 1.900*** 0.543 -2.211* -3.398***
Population Dummy 2 -0.109**
Population Dummy 3 -0.113*
Population Dummy 4 -0.071
Distance to Regional -0.018* 0.209*** -0.083*** 0.055 0.010 0.148***
Capital (ln Km)
FCM
IPP
-0.728*** -1.442*** -0.790*** -1.203*** -1.629*** -0.789***
Investment
Total Expenditure
-0.665*** -0.574 -0.350* -1.305*** 0.650* -0.944***
Public Transfers
Population
0.008* 0.067*** 0.003* 0.014** 0.014* 0.027***
Average Schooling (ln) 1.229*** -0.647 -0.103 0.584 1.393*** 1.588***
Herndhal Index -0.000*** 0.001 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000
% Governmental Coalition 0.006 -0.076 0.425*** -1.281*** 0.424* 0.381
seats
2 0.057*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.019*** 0.031*** 0.031***
 0.403*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000* 0.006*** 0.000
LR test on 2u = 0 79.71*** 92.28*** 117.57*** 84.62*** 81.56*** 83.86***
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
Table No9: Ranking Clusters
Cluster Average E¢ciency S. Deviation Maximum* Minimum
1 0.854 0.198 0.988 0.296
2 0.678 0.151 1.000 0.421
3 0.860 0.185 1.000 0.357
4 0.869 0.192 1.000 0.350
5 0.907 0.157 1.000 0.399
*The maximum may not reach 100%. This is because what it is being reported is the maximum of the average
across three years. i.e. Municipality k might be rst in the ranking with 100% in 2008 and 2009, but second with
97% in 2010, reaching an average of 99%.
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Table No10: Municipal Characterization by its e¢ciency level (Outputs and Input)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
Current Expenditure Top Quantile 14,881 4,468 2,429 1,375 1,414
(Millions of $) Average Cluster 16,959 7,788 2,686 1,914 1,345
Average Students Top Quantile 13,615 5,918 3,853 1,601 1,756
Registered Average Cluster 12,048 9,108 4,017 2,290 1,519
Average Schools (No) Top Quantile 23.1 16.4 22.1 15.8 16.8
Average Cluster 21.3 23.3 20.0 13.5 13.8
Average Health Top Quantile 13.4 7.3 7.2 5.5 7.0
Centres (No) Average Cluster 10.0 9.7 6.6 5.1 5.7
Green Areas (m2) Top Quantile 855,871 155,693 142,928 97,920 33,714
Average Cluster 744,209 363,194 381,033 88,770 29,810
Rubbish (Tons) Top Quantile 100,102 50,929 11,467 4,242 3,357
Average Cluster 75,986 44,921 11,175 6,711 3,105
Average Houses Top Quantile 51,689 13,864 6,046 1,846 1,771
with sewer Average Cluster 42,459 19,832 6,388 3,319 1,696
Social Organizations Top Quantile 1,823 1,539 676 790 435
Average Cluster 1,507 1,521 676 501 367
Tables No11:Municipal Characterization by its e¢ciency level (Determinants)
C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4 C 5
Population Top Quantile 170,871 43,826 37,357 13,201 13,275
Average Cluster 190,407 98,644 32,355 18,457 10,473
Av. Distance to Top Quantile 2.88 60.67 80.50 117.53 90.94
Regional Capital (Km) Average Cluster 2.50 62.97 107.24 115.40 179.95
FCM
IPP
Top Quantile 0.53 0.56 0.68 0.76 0.85
Average Cluster 0.37 0.43 0.66 0.60 0.80
Investment
Total Expenditure
Top Quantile 0.07 0.20 0.15 0.25 0.28
Average Cluster 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.19
Current Transfers Top Quantile 12.50 12.12 9.27 10.72 10.47
from Public Inst. Average Cluster 12.70 11.92 10.77 10.48 10.26
Average Schooling Top Quantile 10.28 9.85 8.86 8.01 7.40
Average Cluster 10.79 10.00 8.96 8.77 7.91
Herndhal Index Top Quantile 2.938 2.407 2.556 2.407 2.426
Average Cluster 2.193 2.188 2.276 2.364 2.253
% of seats of Top Quantile 0.42 0.52 0.53 0.37 0.34
Gov. Coalition Average Cluster 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.40
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Table No12: Multicollinearity of Output variables
Output Variables v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
Population (v1) 1.00
Monthly Registered Students (v2) 0.79 1.00
Number of Public Schools (v3) 0.45 0.69 1.00
Number of Health Centres (v4) 0.51 0.61 0.76 1.00
Maintained Green Areas (v5) 0.50 0.42 0.25 0.36 1.00
Rubbish Collected (v6) 0.92 0.75 0.40 0.49 0.45 1.00
Social Organizations (v7) 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.50 0.29 0.57 1.00
Houses with Sewer (v8) 0.96 0.84 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.91 0.60 1.00
Table No13: Multicollinearity of Determinants
Determinants v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
Per capita Capital Expenditure (v1) 1.00
Distance to Regional Capital (v2) 0.21 1.00
FCM
IPP
(v3) 0.27 0.24 1.00
Investment
Total Expenditure
(v4) 0.56 0.07 0.35 1.00
Transfers from Public Institutions (v5) -0.20 -0.11 -0.23 -0.19 1.00
Average Schooling (v6) -0.19 -0.04 -0.71 -0.43 0.28 1.00
Herndhal Index (v7) 0.08 0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 1.00
% of seats of Governmental Coalition (v8) -0.02 -0.06 -0.18 -0.19 0.04 0.13 0.37 1.00
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Table No14: Alternative Costs Functions
Determinants Translog Cobb-Douglas
Constant -3.065*** -1.521***
Population Dummy 2 -0.214*** -0.109***
Population Dummy 3 -0.094* -0.113*
Population Dummy 4 -0.150 -0.071
Distance to Regional Capital (ln Km) -0.057* -0.018*
FCM
IPP
-0.549*** -0.728***
Investment
Total Expenditure
-0.772*** -0.666***
Public Transfers from Institutions
Population
0.004** 0.008**
Average Schooling (ln) 2.036*** 1.229***
Herndhal Index -0.000** -0.000**
% Governmental Coalition seats 0.163 0.006
2 0.079*** 0.057***
 0.600*** 0.403***
LR test on 2u = 0 15.140*** 79.710***
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
Table No15: Alternative Input variable
Determinants Current Total Current
Expenditure Expenditure
Constant -1.521*** -1.952***
Population Dummy 2 -0.109** -0.172***
Population Dummy 3 -0.113* -0.158**
Population Dummy 4 -0.071 -0.121
Distance to Regional -0.018* -0.020*
Capital (ln Km)
FCM
IPP
-0.728*** -0.693***
Investment
Total Expenditure
-0.666*** -0.660***
Public Transfers
Population
0.008** 0.009**
Average Schooling (ln) 1.229*** 1.461***
Herndhal Index -0.000** -0.000**
% Governmental 0.006 0.033
Coalition seats
2 0.057*** 0.064***
 0.403*** 0.614***
LR test on 2u = 0 79.710*** 72.173***
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
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Table No16: Parametrization of Unobserved Heterogeneity (Mundlak)
Determinants Random E¤ect Random E¤ect
+ Mundlak
Population Dummy 2 -0.109** -0.115**
Population Dummy 3 -0.113* -0.105*
Population Dummy 4 -0.071 -0.003
Distance to Regional -0.018* -0.016*
Capital (ln Km)
FCM
IPP
-0.728*** 0.732***
Investment
Total Expenditure
-0.666*** -1.248***
Public Transfers
Population
0.008** 0.007**
Average Schooling (ln) 1.229*** 0.517***
Herndhal Index -0.000** -0.000**
% Governmental 0.006 0.015
Coalition seats
2 0.057*** 0.044***
 0.403*** 0.489***
LR test on 2u = 0 79.71*** 189.864***
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
Table No17: Introducing Quality
Determinants General Model General Model
with PSU score
Constant -1.521*** -1.515***
Population Dummy 2 -0.109** -0.107**
Population Dummy 3 -0.113* -0.111*
Population Dummy 4 -0.071 -0.070
Distance to Regional -0.018* -0.019*
Capital (ln Km)
FCM
IPP
-0.728*** -0.724***
Investment
Total Expenditure
-0.666*** -0.664***
Public Transfers
Population
0.008*** 0.008***
Average Schooling (ln) 1.229*** 1.222***
Herndhal Index -0.000** -0.000**
% Governmental 0.042 0.043
Coalition seats
Average PSU score 0.010
2 0.057*** 0.057***
 0.403*** 0.397***
LR test on 2u = 0 79.71*** 79.75***
***p<1%, **p<5%, *p<10%
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Figure No1: Municipal Clustering
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Figure No2: Histogram of Ine¢ciency
Cluster 1 Cluster 2
Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Cluster 5 General Case
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